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SUMMARY 
 
In the employment context employers may view certain conduct/behaviour committed 
by an employee or a group of employees to be repugnant and unacceptable resulting 
in the disciplinary action that may lead to a dismissal sanction taken against such 
employee or employees. 
 
Even though the employer has a right to discipline the employees for a contravention 
of a rule or a policy and even dismiss the employee/s involved, such a disciplinary 
action and dismissal must be based on a certain procedure where the principle of 
fairness must be adhered to. 
 
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“the Act”) and Schedule 8 of the Code of Good 
Practice deals with the aspects of dismissals related to conduct and capacity, 
however, each case is unique, it has to be approached on its own merits.  Schedule 
8(3) states that, “formal procedures in disciplinary measures do not have to be 
invoked every time a rule is broken or a standard is not met”.  It is therefore 
necessary that there should be a disciplinary code which guides the workers and the 
employers, it must be clear and be understood by all the parties. 
 
The disciplinary code of conduct serves as the foundation of good discipline because 
everybody knows the consequences of his/her contravention of those guidelines 
enumerated in the Code of Conduct. 
 
The Code of Good Practice under Schedule 8(3), states that “while employees 
should be protected from arbitrary action, employers are entitled to satisfactory 
conduct and work performance from their employees”, so a very good relationship 
between the two parties is most important if there is to be stability and industrial 
peace in the workplace. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of substantive fairness of dismissal for misconduct is an important 
requirement in current South African labour law.  The Code of Good Practice 
provides some guidelines as to what is meant by the concept but the Labour Court 
and arbitrators develop the details of the concept. 
 
Prior to the implementation of the Act in 1979 an all-inclusive legislation regulating 
unfair dismissal law was non-existent.1 
 
The employer can discipline the employee once a misconduct has allegedly been 
committed, but dismissal will only be justified when an employee is guilty of a serious 
misconduct or repeated acts of misconduct.2  The sanction of dismissal is the 
ultimate one in the employment relationship.  Even though the sanction is the 
ultimate one, proper dismissal procedure must be followed before such dismissal 
could be justified.  The dismissal emphasises the principle that it should be resorted 
to as a last resort. 
 
There are five grounds which are recognised by the Act to justify the dismissal of an 
employee, namely misconduct, incapacity or poor work performance and operational 
demands, employee reaching retirement age and where employee refuses to join a 
trade union in terms of a closed shop agreement, is refused union membership or 
expelled from such a union.3  In this treatise the substantive fairness of a dismissal 
for misconduct will be addressed. 
                                                 
1  Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 99 of 1979. 
2  Schedule 8 Item 3(3). 
3  S 26(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS OF A DISMISSAL FOR MISCONDUCT 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this treatise the substantive fairness of a dismissal for misconduct will primarily be 
discussed.  The procedural fairness of a dismissal is also touched upon since it is felt 
that substantive fairness of a dismissal must be supported by a procedural fairness 
approach without which the substantive fairness of such a dismissal will not be fair. 
 
2.2 WHAT IS A DISMISSAL? 
 
According to the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (hereinafter “the Act”) dismissal means 
inter alia that an employer has terminated a contract of employment with or without 
notice.4  In most cases it takes place after the contract of employment has been 
terminated at the instance of the employer who communicated with the employee 
informing him of such a dismissal.  The communication can be carried out by words 
or even the conduct when the employer decides to stop paying the wages of the 
employee. 
 
Under the common law there are two forms of dismissal, a dismissal with notice or 
without notice.  The Act has widened the notion of dismissal to cover other forms of 
dismissal but the research will concentrate on dismissal for misconduct only, and in 
particular the substantive fairness of such dismissals. 
 
For a dismissal to be relevant, there must be two parties, the employer and the 
employee as well as a proper contract of employment.  It is clear that not all 
terminations of the contracts of employment will amount to a dismissal, it could for 
instance happen that the employee has resigned, or that a contract of employment is 
terminated by agreement. 
 
                                                 
4  S 186(a). 
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2.3 MISCONDUCT 
 
Misconduct could be described as any act or omission on the part of the employee 
not in conformity with the set guidelines, standards, rules and policies of the 
workplace.  The misconduct need not be deliberate; even negligence can suffice. 
 
2.4 DEFICIENCIES OF THE COMMON LAW OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
Under the common law the employment relationship is viewed as a contractual 
relationship between the employer and the employee and such a contractual 
relationship can be terminated by either party by simply giving the other party a 
notice or payment of salary in lieu of such a notice, irrespective of the reason for the 
dismissal.  The approach is that procedural fairness before the termination of 
employment is not required.  The employer has power to regulate the conduct of the 
employees and they are expected to obey all reasonable and lawful commands and 
to act in good faith including performing such duties with due diligence and skill.  In 
recent times the Labour Court and arbitrators have accepted the notion that the 
employer has every right to prescribe rules regulating conduct at the workplace, this 
is done in a more satisfactory manner through the inclusion of such structures as 
employee’s unions and all the role players who are party to the collective agreement. 
 
The common law had the following deficiencies which are not in line with section 23 
of the Constitution5 of the Republic of South Africa.  According to Grogan:6 
 
 “- The common law contract of employment is individualistic in nature, paying no 
regard to the collective relationship between employees and employers which 
became an increasing importance with the growth of the trade union movement. 
 
- The common law does not cater for the inherent inequality in bargaining power 
between the employer as the owner of the means of production and the 
employees, who are entirely dependent on supply and demand for their welfare 
and job security. 
 
- The common law pays no regard to the enduring nature of the employment 
relationship, giving the employee no inherent right to press for better conditions of 
employment as time goes by. 
 
                                                 
5  Act 108 of 1996. 
6  Workplace Law (2001) 6th ed at 4. 
  4 
- The common law emphasis on freedom of contract encourages exploitation of 
labour. 
 
- The common law does not promote participative management, in which workers 
have a meaningful say in at least those management decisions which directly 
affect their working conditions and legitimate interests. 
 
- The common law does not provide effective protection to the job security of 
employees.  Section 23 of the Constitution affords all employees the right to ‘fair 
labour practices’ and the right to join and form trade unions and to strike.” 
 
At common law, the cancellation of the contract for any breach can be justified on 
any ground existing at the time of the termination, even if the termination was 
motivated by other factors, not the real one, it will be relevant since a ground can be 
relied on even if the employer was unaware of it.7  The Act approaches the matter 
differently, the employer’s grounds of dismissal are the focus of the inquiry and 
makes other reasons and grounds irrelevant.  Under the common law there is no 
duty to hear the employee before dismissing him or her. 
 
2.5 CONSTITUTION 
 
Section 23(1) of the Constitution8 states that “everyone has the right to fair labour 
practices”.  It is therefore clear that everyone has the right to fair labour practices and 
the right not to be unfairly dismissed. 
 
Grogan9 lists three broad standards for a fair dismissal for misconduct: 
 
“(a) The reason for the dismissal must not be classifiable as automatically unfair. 
 
(b) There must be a valid reason for the termination of the contract (it must be 
substantively fair). 
 
(c) It must be effected in a procedurally fair manner.” 
 
Dismissal as a sanction is the most severe penalty.  Therefore it should be resorted 
to as a last measure and should be imposed in respect of serious  misconduct which 
may not require progressive discipline. 
                                                 
7  See Beeton v Peninsula Transport Co Ltd 1934 CPD 53. 
8  Supra. 
9  Supra at 136. 
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2.6 THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 
 
The International Labour Organisation (“ILO”) is a very important source of 
international labour standards.  Its conventions and recommendations have played a 
significant role in the development of the international labour code.  It has dealt with 
such matters such as unfair dismissal in instruments such as the Termination of 
Employment Recommendation, 1963 (No 119).  This recommendation has been very 
influential on legislation and legal policy in many countries and it has been 
superceded by the Convention Concerning Termination of Employment at the 
initiation of the Employer 1982 and Recommendation 166 (Recommendation 
Concerning Termination of Employment at the initiative of the Employer 1982).  Even 
our Industrial Court on its early stages was clearly influenced by the above 
conventions and recommendations.  In several decisions the court referred to these 
instruments and relied on them as authority for its conclusions.  In at least three 
decisions the court regarded itself as bound by the said instruments. 
 
In Midde Vrystaatse SuiwelKoöperasie v FBWU,10 NAAWU v Pretoria Precision 
Castings (Pty) Ltd11 and Olivier v AECI Plofstowwe & Chemikalieë, Bethal12 
Brassey13 also seem to be of the same opinion having based their views on the 
premise that the said conventions and recommendations are part of international 
customary law which can form part of our law in terms of the Constitution.14 
 
2.7 SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS 
 
Article 4 of the Convention states that the employment of a worker shall not be 
terminated “unless there is a valid reason for such termination connected with the 
capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the 
undertaking, establishment or service”. 
 
                                                 
10  11/2/1877. 
11  (1985) 6 ILJ 369 (IC). 
12  (1988) 9 ILJ 1052 (IC). 
13  Brassey, Cameron, Cheadle and Olivier The New Labour Law (1987) at 234. 
14  S 231(4) of Act 200 of 1993. 
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In addition, article 8 of the Convention specifically states that the following will not 
constitute a valid reason for the termination of employment: 
 
- Union membership or participation in union activities. 
 
- A worker acting or having acted in the capacity of a worker’s representative or 
seeking office as such a representative. 
 
- The filing of a complaint by a worker against an employer in which it is alleged 
that statutory provisions have been violated by the employer. 
 
- The race, colour, sex, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, 
political opinion, national extraction or social origin of a worker. 
 
- Absence from work during maternity leave. 
 
Article 5 of the recommendation lists two further unacceptable grounds for 
termination, namely the age of an employee and absence from work due to 
compulsory military service or other civil obligations. 
 
2.8 SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS – HOW IS IT ESTABLISHED? 
 
The substantive fairness of a dismissal for misconduct committed by the employee 
centres around the two questions that must be asked: 
 
(a) Whether such an employee did contravene the rule and is guilty of the offence 
charged with? 
 
(b) The most important question is whether the seriousness of the offence justifies 
the penalty of dismissal.  The employer must prove the contravention by the 
employee on a balance of probabilities.  There must be an inference in his 
statement that the employee contravened the rule which must be more likely 
than not, whether the rule contravened was a valid or reasonable rule, the 
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employee was aware, or could reasonably be expected to have been aware of, 
whether the rule has been consistently applied by the employer.15 
 
2.9 WAS THE RULE REGULATING CONDUCT CONTRAVENED? 
 
It is important that the contravened rule should exist or be in place and that the 
employee is guilty of such a rule and whether it was a relevant rule.16 
 
2.9.1 THE EXISTENCE OF A RULE REGULATING CONDUCT 
 
In practice, the source of the rule is the written disciplinary code which is understood 
by all concerned.  It has been accepted by both the arbitrators and the old Industrial 
Court that the employer has the right to make rules regulating conduct at the 
workplace.  The power of the employer to regulate the conduct of an employee is to 
be found in the implied common law duties of the employees.  In terms of the 
common law the employee has a duty to obey reasonable and lawful commands 
from his employer as well as the duty to perform his functions with due diligence and 
skill.  However, these duties have been tampered with by the Labour Court when 
dealing with dismissal cases.17 
 
The rule regulating the conduct at the workplace can be described as a general 
information and a guide to how the workers must conduct themselves in relation to 
their work.  The employer has a right to prescribe rules regulating conduct at the 
workplace.  Such a rule or guide must be specific enough to enable employees to 
ascertain what conduct is required of them. 
 
The power of the employer to prescribe such rules regarding discipline derives from 
the nature of the employment relationship, and it can be ascribed to economic factors 
since he has the ownership or the control of the property and the superior bargaining 
power.  The power  of  the  employer to  issue Codes of Conduct is to be found in the 
                                                 
15  Schedule 8 Item 7(b)(ii). 
16  Schedule 8 Item 7(a). 
17  In terms of the Code of Good Conduct Practice “all employers should adopt disciplinary rules 
that establish the standard of conduct required of their employees”.  Schedule 8(3)(1). 
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implied common law duties of employees which prescribe that an employee must 
comply with rather vaguely formulated obligations, eg that the employee must obey 
all reasonable and lawful instructions and to act in good faith and perform his duties 
with due diligence and skill. 
 
The view under common law that the employment relationship was not a permanent 
relationship and could be terminated by notice also gave power to the employer.  The 
courts have adopted a rather less technical approach when interpreting such a Code 
of Conduct.  In CWIU & Another (Pty) Ltd v Hoechst (Pty) Ltd18 the court when 
dealing with the Code came to the conclusion that a Code was an open-ended 
discretionary institution rather than a rigid hierarchical Code of Conduct.  It was not 
an immutable set of commandments that have to be slavishly applied.  This clearly 
indicates that a measure of flexibility should be applied when interpreting the Code of 
Conduct.  It was also confirmed in NEHAWU v Director General of Agriculture19 
where the court rejected the inflexible approach of labouriously and minutely 
examining the employee’s disciplinary code and pouncing with relish on any minute 
deviation. 
 
In Chamber of Mines and NUM20 the arbitrator found the dismissal of a nursing sister 
to be unfair in circumstances where she was found sleeping on duty in the intensive 
care unit of a hospital.  The basis of a decision was the fact that the hospital’s 
disciplinary code, drafted with no doubt with less serious circumstances in mind, 
provided that sleeping on duty in the first instance warranted a written warning, the 
inflexible approach was applied in the case.  It is agreed that flexibility may not 
always favour the employee, there will always be a possibility that a more severe 
penalty may be imposed than that provided by the Code. 
 
It is clear therefore that the Code of Conduct is not the only guide of rules governing 
the conduct of the employees, some rules will be embodied in the written contract of 
employment and other agreements between the employer and the employee, notices 
                                                 
18  (1993) 14 ILJ 471 (IC). 
19  (1993) 14 ILJ 1488 (IC). 
20  (1988) ARB 7.11.1. 
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on notice boards, documents such as manuals, company’s policy or other briefings 
as was found in the case of NUM v Western Holdings Gold Mine.21 
 
The common practice can also develop to such an extent that it becomes the 
company’s policy which is accepted by everyone and in appropriate circumstances 
they can even be orally promulgated as was held in the SACCAWU v City Lodge 
Hotels (Pty) Ltd.22 
 
The employer may amend rules and introduce new ones but has a responsibility to 
bring the new amendments to the attention of the employees.  There is no need for 
the involvement of union members when such disciplinary rules are formulated.  
However, in the case of MAWU v Transvaal Pressed Nuts, Bolts & Rivets (Pty) Ltd,23 
the court stated that the employer is under a duty to negotiate disciplinary rules 
should the union demand to do so.  Where no agreement can be reached between 
the parties, the employer may impose its own rules, however, the requirements of 
reasonableness and fairness must be adhered to.  Within the context of 
reasonableness and fairness the employer must be entitled to set the standards of 
conduct for the company and to see to it that such standards are properly enforced. 
 
In a situation where the employer unilaterally imposed rules that are contested or in 
conflict with the rules imposed by the union, the employer’s rules will normally take 
precedent.  In both cases of Mabizela v Siemens Ltd24 and Errol van Neel v Jungle 
Oats Co25 the misconduct alleged by the employer was a consequence of decisions 
taken by the union in furtherance of collective action.  In Mabizela26 the court stated 
that: 
 
“the fact that the employees in the winding section collectively decided to disobey their 
employer does not confer an immunity against dismissal for a valid reason”. 
 
                                                 
21  (1993) 2 LCD 243 (IC). 
22  (1993) 2 LCD 320 (IC). 
23  (1988) 9 ILJ 696 (IC). 
24  NH 13/2/12. 
25  NHK 11/2/170. 
26  Supra 9. 
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There are some other sources from which rules regulating conduct could be found, 
such as rules imposed by the statutes, eg Occupational Health and Safety Act.27  
Under the common law a contractual principle is found, where the employee is 
obliged to obey all reasonable and lawful instructions from his employer and to 
further the interests of the employer.  The conflict of the employee’s interests and 
those of his employer could lead to the employee’s dismissal from his work.  In 
SACTWU v R Stumpfe t/a De Lederhandler, George,28 the employee worked for his 
employer at home manufacturing and repairing leather goods for his own account.  
He was found to have been fairly dismissed as a result of such conflict of interests.  
The court stated that “even if the employer and employee had not specifically agreed 
that the employee could not do the work complained of in his spare time, the 
employee had a common law duty to further the business interests of the employer 
and to avoid a conflict between his interests and those of the employer, he could not 
compete with his employer”.  The conduct of the employee was viewed as a serious 
breach of contract and that dismissal was justified. 
 
2.9.2 THE CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULE 
 
It is important in disciplinary proceedings to establish not only the existence of a rule 
but whether there has been a contravention of such a rule formulated by the 
employer.  In some instances it is very difficult for most people involved in a 
disciplinary inquiry to decide the factual question whether the rule was contravened 
due to the fact that such people do not have the required skills of cross-examination 
and assessment of the evidence.  The fear of retribution sometimes dissuade a 
person from giving material evidence.  It therefore becomes necessary to determine 
what rules of evidence are applicable in a disciplinary inquiry or whether normal rules 
will be applicable.  It is important in cases of this nature to find out who bears the 
onus of proof and the standard of proof required.  It is also necessary that people 
involved in such inquiries should at least have the basic knowledge of how to deal 
effectively with cases of alleged misconduct. 
 
                                                 
27  85 of 1993. 
28  (1992) 13 ILJ 388 (IC). 
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2.10 THE VALIDITY OF THE RULE 
 
A valid rule is not contrary to any law of public policy, an invalid rule is arbitrary and 
capricious.  As we have noted in the above comment that the employer has every 
right to formulate the rules regulating the conduct of the employees, the courts will 
always see to it that the rules formulated are reasonable and valid, if the rule is not 
reasonable it cannot be a valid one.  Therefore whatever disciplinary steps taken 
under such a rule could be declared unfair.  Where a rule is valid and relevant to the 
needs and circumstances of such a business place it is viewed as lawful and 
legitimate.  In the case of Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v Roux NO29 the court 
gave the following test: 
 
“Was the rule reasonably related to (a) the orderly, efficient and safe operation of the 
company’s business, and (b) the performance that the company might properly expect 
of the employee?” 
 
There are certain factors that must be taken into account when considering the 
validity of the rule, eg the nature of the employer’s business and the circumstances in 
which it operates.   
 
The court in the case of Swanepoel v AECI Ltd30 justified the introduction of a strict 
disciplinary rule dealing with inter-racial assault because of the situation prevalent 
within the factory.  The type of work performed by the worker and the circumstances 
in which the work is performed, eg some workers are employed in positions of trust 
where the company relies heavily in such a worker, eg people employed as bank 
tellers and police officials etc.  Should such people commit a serious misdeed in 
his/her performance of duty, a sanction of dismissal may be a proper one. 
 
In some oil companies smoking within the premises may be prohibited as a means of 
safety precaution and if a worker is found smoking, his dismissal could be justified. 
 
                                                 
29  (1988) 9 ILJ 45 (IC) 209. 
30  (1984) 5 ILJ 41 (IC). 
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Where a rule was agreed on by collective agreement between the employer and the 
employees, there is a strong possibility that the courts would accept its validity as 
was shown in the case of NEHAWU v Director General.31 
 
The employer must be careful when resorting to disciplinary rules, if in the past the 
contravention of the rule was never enforced, that may give an impression that does 
not consider the rule to be valid and the court may be hesitant to justify such 
dismissal based on such rule.  Furthermore, the employer could be accused of being 
selective and inconsistent which is not an accepted principle in the employment 
relationship. 
 
2.10.1 KNOWLEDGE OF THE RULE 
 
The employee must know the disciplinary rule or ought to have reasonable 
knowledge of the rule. 
 
It is an accepted principle in a work situation that an employee could only be 
disciplined for contravening a rule he is aware of or could reasonably be expected to 
have knowledge of it.  It is very important that all employers should strive and ensure 
that the Code of Conduct they set up is known to all employees.  This can be done 
through many ways either by distributing pamphlets of disciplinary codes, use of 
lecture meetings with the workers, written briefs, notices fixed on company’s notice 
boards and the use of induction lectures on new employees.  Whenever there is a 
need to introduce a new rule or to amend an existing rule it must be brought to the 
attention of all employees.  Apart from the above-stated formal rules there could be 
rules that are not formally applied because the employee is reasonably expected to 
know that disciplinary action will be taken against him should he contravene such an 
informal rule, eg assaults and even intimidation, theft, working under influence of 
liquor, insolence and insubordinaton.  In these instances reasonable sense dictates 
that such contraventions will lead to disciplinary action and dismissal. 
 
                                                 
31  (1993) 14 ILJ 1488 (IC). 
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2.11 CONSISTENCY MUST BE ADHERED TO IN DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS 
 
It is always important to apply the element of consistency in disciplinary actions if 
fairness is to be the objective of any disciplinary action, as it does not help to apply 
the disciplinary measures in a selective manner.  As it has been stated above that 
failure to take action in the past may be an indication that the employer regarded the 
rule as invalid.  In the case of NUM v Amcoal Collieries & Industrial Operations Ltd32 
the Labour Appeal Court distinguished between “historical inconsistency” and 
“contemporaneous inconsistency”. 
 
Historical inconsistency is when an employer has not dismissed an employee as a 
matter of practice or impose a disciplinary sanction for such a contravention of the 
rule, but suddenly decides to dismiss or impose a sanction for contravention of the 
same rule, that will not be a lawful thing to do because many employees may be 
under the impression that the rule was no more valid.  Where employees commit the 
same disciplinary offence contemporaneously and are not all disciplined, or they 
receive different disciplinary penalties, amounts to unfairness which is based on the 
proposition that similar cases should be treated in the same way.  If the employer 
does not do that, the inference may be drawn that the employer acts in an arbitrary 
and discriminatory way.  Inconsistency sometimes can never be regarded as unfair.  
The employer who resorted to inconsistency must be able to justify it because of 
factors such as the employee’s record of service, may be an employee has a long 
clean record of service or the seriousness of the contravention.  The employer may 
also justify the inconsistent enforcement of a rule on the basis that changed 
circumstances make it necessary to take a different view of the need to enforce the 
rule.  Contemporaneous inconsistency entails that the employer dismisses only some 
of the employees who have breached the same rule of conduct at the same time, 
such inconsistency may make the dismissal unfair and inappropriate. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court in the case of Early Bird Farms (Pty) Ltd v Mlambo33 held 
that “the respondent  and Maziya were guilty of the same offence, the theft of chicken 
                                                 
32  (1992) 13 ILJ 1449 (LAC). 
33  (1997) 5 BLLR 541 (LAC). 
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pieces.  Prima facie, they should have received the same penalty.  ‘I say prima facie, 
because an employer may be justified in differentiating between employees, guilty of 
the same offence, on the basis of differences in the personal circumstances of the 
employees (such as their length of service and disciplinary record) or the merits 
(such as the roles played in the commission of the misconduct’”. 
 
In NUM v Council for Mineral Technology34 the employer was held to have been 
justified in distinguishing between the employees who were dismissed and other 
employees, the former had played the most active role in the detention of members 
of management during a sit in. 
 
If the employer is unable to point out or identify all the culprits the guilty offenders, 
those who have been identified, cannot rely on the parity principle simply because 
the employer was unable to identify all the culprits.  The Labour Appeal Court in 
SACCAWU v Irvin & Johnson35 pointed out that there was in fact no principle 
involved in the parity rule, but that consistency was simply an element of disciplinary 
fairness.  Conradie JA stated the approach that ought to be adopted as follows: 
 
“Discipline must not be capricious.  It is really the perception of bias inherent in 
selective discipline that makes it unfair. 
 
Where, however, one is faced with a large number of offending employees, the best 
one can hope for is reasonable consistency.  Some inconsistency is the price to be 
paid, flexibility which requires the exercise of a discretion in each individual case.  If 
the chairperson conscientiously and honestly, but incorrectly, exercises his or her 
discretion in a particular way, it would not mean that there was unfairness to the other 
employees.  It would mean no more than that his or her assessment of the gravity of 
the disciplinary offence was wrong.  It cannot be fair that other employees profit from 
that kind of wrong decision.  In the case of a plurality of dismissals, a wrong decision 
can only be unfair if it is capricious, induced by improper motives or, worse, from a 
discriminating management policy.  Even then I dare say that it might not be so unfair 
as to undo the outcome of other disciplinary inquiries. 
 
If, for example, one member of a group of employees who committed a serious offence 
against the employer is, for improper motives, not dismissed, it would not, in my view, 
necessary mean that the other miscreants should escape.  Fairness is a value 
judgment.  It might or might not in the circumstances be fair to reinstate the other 
offenders.  The point is that consistency is not a rule in itself.” 
 
                                                 
34  (1999) 3 BLLR 209 (LAC). 
35  (1999) 20 ILJ 2302 (LAC). 
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The court found that the fact that some employees were guilty of misconduct during 
industrial action were given warnings, whereas others were dismissed, did not render 
the dismissal unfair. 
 
Conradie JA puts it quite clear that consistency must be adhered to where possible, 
but if events or circumstances are such that it could not be adhered to, it is 
permissible not to adhere to it and the dismissal will still be justified.  This became 
clear in Lubners Furnishers v SA Commercial Catering & Allied Worker’s Union36 
where Mr Hlunganisa an employee of Lubners Furnishers and a number of other 
employees illegally occupied the premises of Lubners Furnishers to lend force to 
their wage demands.  Mr Hlunganisa was the only employee who was subsequently 
dismissed by Lubners Furnishers for his illegal occupation of the premises.  The 
Labour Appeal Court found that this factor did not make the dismissal unfair.  It found 
that Mr Hlunganisa was the only employee who had been identified by Mrs Blignaut, 
the assistant credit controller of the company who had remained on the premises 
when the employees illegally occupied the premises.  He was also guilty of more 
serious transgressions than the other employees in that he had switched off the lights 
and unplugged telephones. 
 
The consistency principle should be applied very carefully by the employers when 
distinguishing between workers who acted in collective misconduct and those who 
acted individually in misconduct.  In the case of SACTWU v Novel Spinners (Pty) 
Ltd37 it was held that an employer may not take into account earlier warnings issued 
for individual absenteeism when deciding whether to dismiss employees for 
participation in a stay away.  If the employees are found guilty after having committed 
the same offence then the parity principle applies.  In an unreported case of Metcash 
Trading (Pty) Ltd t/a Trador Cash & Carry Wholesalers v Sithole NO,38 the Labour 
Court set aside a CCMA arbitration award because the Commissioner did not 
understand the parity principle after three employees were dismissed by separate 
presiding officers, whereas one employee had been acquitted by another presiding 
officer, and two other employees had their charges withdrawn.  The court held that 
                                                 
36  (1996) 17 ILJ 660 (LAC). 
37  (1999) 11 BLLR 1157 (LC). 
38  Labour Court case No 51079/97 dated 1 September 1998 (unreported). 
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the Commissioner had failed to understand the Code of Good Conduct, so the 
dismissal was unjustified.  In the case of Truworths Limited v Ramabulana NO39 the 
Labour Court held that the Commissioner had erred grossly by finding that the 
respondent employee had been unfairly dismissed because her supervisor was not 
disciplined for failing to detect the employee’s dishonest act.  The court went on to 
state that, “the supervisor had, at worst, been guilty of negligence, while the 
employee had dishonestly attempted to defraud the employer”. 
 
To promote sound objectivity and consistency in the workplace, the Code40 requires 
that records should be kept for each worker clearly specifying disciplinary 
transgressions, the action taken by the employer and the reason for such action. 
 
2.12 APPROPRIATE SANCTION TO BE APPLIED 
 
The right of the employer to formulate rules regulating conduct also includes the right 
to formulate and impose sanctions for the breach of such rules.  The Code and the 
Labour Courts are of the view that dismissal should be resorted to in cases of serious 
infractions and should be resorted to lastly.  The Code mentions quite a number of 
factors that must be considered, eg previous disciplinary record and personal 
circumstances, including the length of service. 
 
It is always difficult to determine whether a sanction of dismissal is an appropriate 
one more so in cases of first time offenders or whether another sanction eg a 
warning or even demotion should not be imposed.  In some Industrial Court decisions 
and arbitration awards, suspension without pay is also seen as a form of disciplinary 
sanction.  The employer since he has a right to formulate rules regulating the conduct 
of workers, he has also the right to formulate and impose penalties for the 
contravention of such rules.  The sanction prescribed by the formulated rules of 
conduct will be regarded in most cases as the determination of the appropriateness 
of such a sanction, eg if such a contravention warrants the imposition of a warning 
according to  the Code,  if  any  other sanction is imposed it will be regarded as unfair 
                                                 
39  (1999) 12 BLLR 1369 (LC). 
40  Schedule 8 Item 5. 
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even though the presiding officer may be of the opinion that a more severe sanction 
eg that of dismissal is justified, unless the employees are informed that a different 
sanction will be imposed in future for such a contravention. 
 
The employers must, however, be careful when imposing the severe sanction 
formulated in the employer’s rules, the courts and arbitrators may overturn such a 
sanction if it is regarded to be too excessive.  There are many factors that must be 
considered in determining the appropriateness of a sanction, eg the seriousness of 
the conduct, the employer’s consistency, the length of service, the disciplinary record 
of the employee and the general attitude of the employee and his previous misdeeds.  
The nature of the business place as well as the work performed by the employee is 
very important to be taken note of.  In the case of Finck v Ohlssons Cape Breweries41 
the court accepted the nature of the employer’s business and justified the dismissal 
of an employee for consuming liquor on the premises, for the employee to consume 
liquor in such place was viewed very seriously, this view was also held in the case of 
Rosenberg v Mega Plastics (Pty) Ltd42 where an employee was on duty and 
dismissed for being intoxicated when driving a heavy truck, the dismissal was 
justified.  The Code allows the use of informal advice and counselling in minor 
incidents of misconduct43 if the offences are repeatedly committed, warnings leading 
to final warnings are preferably.  In the Code an example of sufficiently serious 
offences to justify dismissal is given as gross dishonesty eg thefts, fraud, etc, wilful 
damage to the property of the employer, wilful endangering of the safety of other 
workers in the business place, assault on the employer or another worker, or client or 
customer and conduct that is viewed as gross insubordination.  When deciding on 
the nature of the offence committed it is important to look at the aggravating 
circumstances which will include the wilfulness and intention on the part of the 
employee, lack of remorse shown by the employee, previous valid warnings imposed 
on the employee and a long record of contravention of offences.  It is important that 
the employer must bring to the notice of the employee all such misconduct. 
 
                                                 
41  (1985) 1 LCD 20. 
42  (1984) 5 ILJ 29 (IC). 
43  Schedule 8 Item 3(3). 
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It is important for presiding officers to look at the mitigating factors when presiding on 
such trials, eg the long service and even exemplary service and even in cases of 
short periods, an unblemished disciplinary conduct, showing of remorse by the 
employee after having committed such misconduct, but where the employee was 
forced by others to commit an offence this would be a mitigating factor because he 
acted under duress fearing for his safety as well as his family, and the employee’s 
personal circumstances.  Although in Rosenberg v Mega Plastics (Pty) Ltd 44 the court 
decided that personal circumstances of the employee were not relevant.  In the later 
case of National Union of Mineworkers v East Rand Proprietary Mines Ltd 45 dismissal 
was unfair because the employer had not given adequate consideration to the 
employee’s personal circumstances. 
 
There is a limitation to mitigating factors unrelated to the misconduct that could be 
relied on by the employee eg having a clean record, remorse and long service.  In De 
Beers Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation46 the 
court went on to say that “these factors are not really ‘mitigating’ circumstances at all, 
in the sense in which a clean record may serve to reduce a penalty in a criminal trial.  
The only relevance of a clean record in the employment context, said the learned 
judge, is the extent to which it indicates that the employee is likely to repeat the 
offence.  Where, as in De Beers, the employees concerned had shown no remorse 
and had by their conduct done nothing to show that they would not again commit 
their acts of dishonesty, there was no reason why the employer should have shown 
leniency.  In Conradie’s view, the arbitrating Commissioner’s decision that a final 
written warning would have been a more appropriate penalty had to be set aside on 
this ground”.   
 
It became clear in the case of Kammies v Golden Arrow Bus Service (Pty) Ltd 47 that 
the mere fact that a disciplinary code stipulates a maximum sanction of a final 
warning for a specific offence does not prevent the employer from dismissing an 
employee   for   a   more  serious  offence.   In  this  case  the  disciplinary  code  had 
                                                 
44  Supra. 
45  (1987) 8 ILJ 315 (IC) at 321D. 
46  (2000) 21 ILJ 1051 (LAC). 
47  (1994) 15 ILJ 1113 (IC). 
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stipulated for a maximum penalty of a final warning for a first offence of negligent 
driving and the employee admitted to blameworthy involved in 43 accidents, nine 
expired warnings for negligent driving, ten final warnings for other offences, and five 
previous dismissals and subsequent reinstatements.  This clearly shows that the 
employer could exercise his discretion accordingly. 
 
In NUMSA obo Valent/Volkswagen of SA (Pty) Ltd48 where the arbitrator held that 
“the employer was not bound by the maximum penalty in its disciplinary code if the 
offence in question went beyond the degree of gravity contemplated by the code”. 
 
In the case of County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation 
and Arbitration49 the above principle was confirmed by the Labour Appeal Court.  The 
court held that “in evaluating whether dismissal was a reasonable sanction, it should 
be recognised that there was a range within which reasonable people might 
reasonably disagree on the penalty for a particular offence.  Where the employer’s 
decision fell within that range, commissioners or judges should not interfere merely 
because they would have preferred a better penalty”.  Kroon JA stated: 
 
“It remains part of our law that it lies in the first place within the province of the 
employer to set the standards of conduct to be observed by its employees and to 
determine the sanction with which non-compliance with the standard will be visited.  
Interference therewith is only justified in the case of unreasonableness and 
unfairness.” 
 
In the De Beer’s 50 case where the employees had fraudulently claimed payment for 
overtime they had not performed.  The award reinstating them subject to a final 
warning was set aside with Zondo AJP dissenting, holding that the case was 
distinguishable from the Toyota case because the employees’ dishonesty was not 
“gross”.  In Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe51 the court unanimously 
agreed that “a final warning was patently inadequate for an employee who had 
falsely claimed that his company car had been hijacked in order to conceal the fact 
that he had damaged it in an accident”.  In the Nampak Corrugated Wadeville v 
                                                 
48  (1999) 5 BALR 631 (IMSSA). 
49  (1999) 20 ILJ 1701 (LAC). 
50  Supra. 
51  (2000) 21 ILJ 340 (LAC). 
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Khoza52 the Labour Appeal Court reaffirmed the principle that the employer is entitled 
to set the standards of conduct for its employees and to see to the maintenance of 
such standards, and Nicholson JA held that commissioners must decide for 
themselves whether penalties imposed by employers are fair, and are free to impose 
lesser penalties if they deem fit, a view which was overturned in the later case of 
Toyota.53 
 
Ngcobo AJP as he then was added the following in a concurring judgment in the 
County Fair Foods54 case: 
 
“If commissioners could substitute their judgment and discretion for the judgment and 
discretion fairly exercised by the employers, then the function of management would 
have been abdicated – employees would take every case to the CCMA.  This result 
would not be fair to employers.  In my view, interference with the sanction imposed by 
the employer is only justified where the sanction is unfair or where the employer acted 
unfairly in imposing the sanction.  this would be the case, for example, where the 
sanction is so excessive as to shock one’s sense of fairness.  In such a case, the 
commissioner has a duty to interfere.” 
 
The principle adopted by both judges Kroon and Zondo has in a way brought sanity 
and order in the work place, if the commissioners were allowed to impose lesser 
penalties if they deem fit there could be a flood of cases referred to the CCMA by the 
employees whenever they are punished for contravening the rule of conduct, the 
employers could be undermined by the employees and that could affect production 
and stability in the work place.  The employer’s penalties must be recognised 
provided that they are fair and reasonable.  Only if a penalty is not fair and 
reasonable commissioners should interfere with it. 
 
2.13 CORRECTIVE APPROACH 
 
The Code under Schedule 8 Item 3(2) advocates a corrective or progressive 
approach to discipline involving behaviour modification through a system of 
progressive disciplinary actions with the aim of improving the disciplinary patterns of 
the affected employees, eg where misconduct of a minor nature would be dealt  with 
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53  Supra. 
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through informal approach such as advice and counselling leading to giving warnings 
according to Schedule 8 Item 3(3) and up to final warning should the employee 
continue with the contravention of the rule, the warning must be in a written form and 
is signed by the employee, but in serious cases of misconduct the employee may be 
dismissed if the continued employment relationship becomes intolerable.  However, 
in National Union of Mineworkers v Free State Consolidated Gold Mines55 the 
Appellate Division (as it then was) expressed doubt as to whether dismissal was 
justified only when misconduct had the effect of irreparably harming the employment 
relationship between the employer and employee; it held that the least that was 
required was that the misconduct should have been “serious”, but in the case of 
Nkomo v Pick ’n Pay Retailers56 the court ruled that dismissal was too drastic a 
penalty where the theft involved a single pie by the employee.  It seems that it 
depends on the employer in the first place to decide whether he wants to dismiss or 
not in a case involving theft of a minor nature.  The case that comes to mind is 
Komane v Fedsure Life57 in which it was held that “once it was proved that an 
employee was guilty of theft, no matter how small the value of the goods involved (in 
casu a packet of powdered milk) there was no reason to inquire into whether the 
misconduct was “gross” and whether the employment relationship had been 
rendered “intolerable”, in such cases a dismissal will be justified.  So the concept of 
corrective approach is reasonable fair and it must be encouraged rather than to opt 
for the maximum penalty of dismissal even though the value involved is not 
significant, a warning in writing should be resorted to and even counselling of such 
an employee.  There is quite a number of serious cases that will justify dismissal 
including offences such as gross insubordination and gross negligence.  This was 
held by the Industrial Court in CWIU v Total (Pty) Ltd 58 that a first offence of gross 
negligence was serious enough for dismissal. 
 
Dismissal would be substantively unfair under some of the following conditions: 
 
                                                 
55  (1995) 13 ILJ 573 (LAC) at 5911. 
56  (1989) 10 ILJ 937 (IC). 
57  (1998) 2 BLLR 215 (CCMA). 
58  (1995) 16 ILJ 1233 (IC).  The Industrial Court judgment is reported at (1995) 16 ILJ 1233 (IC) 
and the unreported appeal judgment was delivered on 14 December 1994. 
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· The dismissed employee is unaware of the alleged rule he is alleged to have 
contravened, was never informed about it. 
 
· Clear reason for the dismissal must be established, eg a rule must be 
contravened if not there can be no fair dismissal. 
 
· The sanction imposed is inconsistent with the treatment of other employees 
who committed the same offence. 
 
· Dismissal was ordered without the consideration of mitigating factors. 
 
· The sanction is too severe for the offence which was committed. 
 
· The dismissal constitutes victimisation of the employee and all dismissals that 
contravene law, service contract, wage determination or industrial council 
agreement. 
 
· The employer is unable to justify the penalty of dismissal, the employer must 
establish on the balance of probability and on reasonable grounds, that the 
offence was committed and was serious. 
 
· Failure to give a fair hearing to the employee before dismissing him. 
 
· Failure to conduct proper investigation into the alleged misconduct of the 
employee. 
 
2.14 ONUS IN MISCONDUCT DISMISSALS 
 
If a dismissal is imposed, then it is the duty of the employer in terms of section 192(2) 
to prove that the dismissal was fair, this is a departure from the approach which was 
found under the 1956 LRA where no onus vested on either party, now the employer 
must prove that the dismissal was both substantively and procedurally fair.  The 
employer must first investigate the allegation of misconduct properly and thereafter 
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hold a proper hearing.  The employer need not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt 
that the offence was committed by the employee like in the criminal courts but if he is 
satisfied on a balance of probability.  In the case of Moahlodi v East Rand Gold & 
Uranium Co Ltd59 the court formulated the test as follows: 
 
“An employer need not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that an employee has 
committed the offence.  The test to be applied is whether the employer had reasonable 
grounds for believing that the employee had committed the offence.  It is sufficient if, 
after making his own investigations, he arrives at a decision on a balance of 
probabilities, that the offence was committed by the employee provided that he affords 
the employee a fair opportunity of stating his story in refutation of the charge.” 
 
In the case of Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & 
Arbitration60 the award of the CCMA commissioner was set aside because the 
commissioner adopted the criminal standard of proof beyond “reasonable doubt”, 
rather than the balance of probability which is applied in the civil courts. 
 
When deciding on a balance of probability, the ultimate question is whether the 
arguments of the party having to prove onus were probable than not, this does not 
mean that a party met by a denial could not succeed unless the arbitrator was certain 
that the other side was not telling the truth.  It is sufficient if the version of the 
employer is more probable than that of the employee. 
 
In Electrical & Allied Workers Trade Union v The Production Casting Co (Pty) Ltd61 
the court proposed a different test, that: 
 
“if the employer is of the bona fide view that as a result of the employee’s conduct 
which has come to his attention and which he has investigated to such an extent that 
would exclude any grounds that he (the employer) has acted arbitrarily, the 
relationship between him and the employee has become intolerable for commercial or 
public interest reasons, he will be entitled to dismiss the employee …  If an employer 
for instance mistrusts an employee for reasons which he must obviously justify (not 
according to any particular standard of proof), and he can show that such mistrust, as 
a result of certain conduct of the employee, is counter-productive to his commercial 
activities or the public interests (where appropriate) he would be entitled to terminate 
the relationship”. 
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In the case of Blackie & Co Ltd v Yeomans62 the Labour Appeal Court stated that the 
onus was on the employer to establish the breach of the disciplinary rule and that 
must be proved on a balance of probabilities. 
                                                 
62  1992 1 LCD 5 (LAC). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SPECIFIC ACTS OF MISCONDUCT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter offences justifying dismissal from work will be discussed.  However, 
this does not suggest that if an employee commits any one of them, dismissal is 
automatically warranted.  The seriousness of the offence concerned and its impact 
on the employment relationship must be assessed in the light of the particular 
circumstances of each case. 
 
3.2. ABSENTEEISM FROM WORK AND TIME-RELATED OFFENCES 
 
Under the common law an employee must place himself or herself at the disposal of 
the employer.  Deliberate absence from work is viewed as a serious misconduct and 
in most cases dismissal is justified, however, not every incident of absence, whether 
isolated or whatever duration, warrants dismissal.  However, where an employee is 
absent repeatedly, or where a single incident of absence detrimentally affects the 
employee’s business, dismissal will be justified. 
 
The Labour Courts have enforced this obligation noting that the employer has a right 
to expect better service and discipline from the employee including not to be 
unnecessary absent from work in circumstances where the absence cannot be 
justified.  The onus will rest on the employee to justify his absence from work.  Being 
late on duty frequently can create problems for the employer if the employee’s 
position at work is such that he must at all times be at his/her post, dismissal will be 
justified if such late coming to work does not stop.  The rule against absence from 
work without a valid reason originates from the common law obligation that the 
employee shall at all times makes his services available to the employer.63 
 
                                                 
63  See Jordaan in Rycroft and Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law (1993) 2nd ed at 50 
where unlawful absence from work is regarded as serious misconduct that warrants dismissal. 
See the discussion by Grogan Riekert’s Basic Employment Law (1993) 2nd ed at 30. 
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In Mkele v SA Breweries Ltd 64  the court upheld a dismissal of workers who had been 
expressly advised to report for duty in accordance with specific shift working 
arrangements and they failed to do so. 
 
Where absence from work is the result of sick leave being granted, the employee is 
expected to be on sick leave and must not use the leave for other unauthorised 
purposes. 
 
In Rand Mutual and NUM65 the arbitrator held that “the employer who is paying the 
employee while he or she is absent, has a material interest in the employee’s return 
to health; it is entitled to expect the employee to follow the prescribed treatment 
faithfully and return to work the moment he or she recovers.  Sick leave is granted 
because the employee cannot work; it is intended as a period of recuperation during 
which the employee can recover his capacity to work, and, once the employee 
recuperates, he or she is expected to return to work forthwith.  The fact that a fixed 
period of sick leave has been granted does not alter this position in fixing the period 
of sick leave the employer does no more than indicate that a further absence will 
require a fresh application for leave which will have to be motivated.  In my view an 
employee who is absent from work through illness is bound, within reason, to do 
whatever is required in order to make a proper recovery and to return to work as 
soon as he or she does recover.  Failure to comply with this obligation would, in my 
view, amount to a disciplinary offence”.  The employee must prove reason that will 
justify his absence from work. 
 
3.2.1 USE OF ABUSIVE LANGUAGE 
 
Employers are entitled to enforce good standards by all at work including harmonious 
relationship.  Superiors, fellow workers and third parties must be treated with 
discipline and any use of abuse language against them may lead to dismissal, 
particularly when it amounts to insolence, and when it is directed at visitors such as 
customers and  clients  where  abuse  has  racial connotations or sexual harassment. 
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The manner in which the language was used is very important to be taken note of as 
well as the circumstances and place in which the language was used.  There is a 
clear difference between language that is merely jocular or rude, as opposed to 
abusive (uncivil).  The nature of the business of the company plays a very important 
part to determine whether the language is abusive and the degree to which it may 
constitute such an abuse, in some work place or business it may be endeared as not 
abuse whereas in another place it may be abusive. 
 
It is even worse if the abusive language is directed at the officials such as superiors, 
supervisors and will constitute insubordination, justifying disciplinary steps and even 
dismissal.  In Union Spinning Mills and ACTWUSA66 the arbitrator stated “it is often 
very difficult to distinguish between language used on the shop floor which 
undermines the authority of the employer and that which is jocular or rude.  The 
degree of tolerance for what is sometimes called ‘industrial language’ varies from one 
plant to another and whether use of the same words constitutes insubordination may 
differ from plant to plant and circumstances to circumstances”. 
 
Racial connotations are as bad and serious, it is beyond the humiliation and dignity of 
a person against whom it is directed.  In Siemens Ltd and NUMSA67 the arbitrator 
stated that 
 
 “racial insults go beyond those to whom they are individually directed.  They impact 
upon the workplace as a whole.  This is particularly applicable where the bulk of the 
workforce is black and the language in issue has the effect of humiliating and 
degrading blacks generally.  The company officials equated racially abusive language 
with any swear word.  I regard this approach as simplistic.  Racially abusive language 
is more serious precisely because of its broader implications.” 
 
It is even worse if such racial remarks are directed by a white employee at a black 
employee in circumstances where there is a rule against verbal abuse.  It is 
presumed that the rule is general even in cases where a black employee uses such 
derogatory remarks against a white employee, the rule will have been contravened.  
In Checkers SA Ltd and SACCAWU68 the arbitrator stated that 
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 “I am of the view that ordinary men and women ought to be protected from having to 
endure racial abuse and whilst no doubt every man and woman is entitled to think what 
he or she likes, it is incumbent upon him or her to conceal their socially unacceptable 
thoughts and to preserve at least a façade of respect for others.  Accordingly I 
conclude that there was no substantive unfairness in the dismissal of the grievant.” 
 
3.2.2  DRUGS AND ALCOHOL USE 
 
Drug and alcohol use is a form of conduct that may indicate a serious form of 
incapacity and misconduct.  It is suggested by the Code of Conduct that since it is a 
form of misconduct and incapacity, counselling and rehabilitation should be resorted 
to by the employer to assist the affected employee.  The employer has every right to 
make rules prohibiting the use of both the substances and to treat a breach of such a 
rule in a more serious light although it must be noted that drunkenness at work and 
alcohol abuse in general are two separate things.  Drunkenness at work will be 
followed by a severe disciplinary action including the sanction of dismissal, this is so 
in workplaces where drunkenness could be extremely dangerous, eg in mines, 
chemical industries, transport companies and explosives factories. 
 
Where there are specific rules against abuse of alcohol at work, the rule will be 
specific to the fact that an absolute rule to the effect that no employee may be under 
the influence of liquor when on duty.  When his ability to do the job may be impaired, 
and that an employee’s blood alcohol level may not exceed a certain specified level. 
 
In many cases proof of drunkenness is ascertained through the use of a breathalyser 
test, although the use of a breathalyser is not essential, nevertheless it serves to 
provide evidence that the employee is indeed under the influence of liquor.  Some 
arbitrators are reluctant to make use of the evidence of a breathalyser test and some 
have even condemned the use of such evidence. 
 
In the case of Protea Gardens Hotel (Pty) Ltd 69 the arbitrator made no finding on the 
reliability or fallibility of a breathalyser, something indicating that such a test is not 
favoured as conclusive evidence of intoxication.  The use of the instrument was 
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condemned in the strongest terms by the arbitrator in Castle Lead Works (Tvl) (Pty) 
Ltd and NUMSA70 where the arbitrator stated 
 
 “the system called ‘Alcolyser’ is quite unsatisfactory for the purpose of determining 
either the extent of the alcohol consumption or whether or not the employee was under 
the influence of alcohol and no possible finding can be made based on this test.  If the 
company were to use this as a basis for a further test by a district surgeon then that 
would be its only value.  It certainly would not justify a dismissal, irrespective of what 
this so-called test revealed.” 
 
What is clear though is the fact that the use of a breathalyser test is permissible to 
provide evidence of intoxication, but such evidence must be supported by evidence 
of eyewitnesses who should testify as to the employee’s gait, manner of speech, his 
condition whether he was unsteady on his feet or not and whether his eyes were 
bloodshot.  The evidence of a breathalyser test is not definitive, it must be 
corroborated by visual evidence.  The evidence should indicate that the instrument 
was properly administered if any reliance is to be placed on it. 
 
In the case of Price Club and CCAWUSA71 the arbitrator suggested the following 
procedure: “When a breathalyser is used it would seem essential that a witness be 
present for the employee.  It would also seem desirable that there be a witness for 
the management.  Here there was what the assistant manager claimed to be an 
independent, neutral witness in the form of the head of security.  Security was 
supplied by an outside company but it is likely that the employees would have seen 
security personnel as being part of the management.  If at the end of the test there 
had been a paper signed by the person conducting the test, in this case an assistant 
manager, and by a witness for management, in this case the head of security, and if 
it had been signed by the employee and his witness there would have been no 
dispute about the validity of the test.” 
 
There is a view that a finding that an employee is intoxicated does not always 
warrant a dismissal, except where the occupation of the employee is relevant and 
therefore the intoxication would pose a threat to the safety of others as was the case 
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in Rosenberg v Mega Plastics (Pty) Ltd72 where the court upheld the dismissal for 
drunkenness of an employee who was the driver of a heavy duty truck.  In Finck v 
Ohlssons Cape Breweries73 the court upheld a rule in terms of which the mere 
consumption of alcohol on the premises was a dismissable offence. 
 
An approach that is bearing fruits where an employee has been found to be under 
the influence of liquor when on duty is to make an assessment to determine the 
reason for the liquor related misconduct through a subordinate inquiry to determine 
whether the employee has a drinking problem, but where the employee declines the 
assessment, and does not want to undergo counseling or treatment, disciplinary 
measures must be applied against him, starting by first warning or suspension 
without pay.  In cases of repeated misuse of liquor at work and it is evident that 
endeavours to improve and correct his behaviour have failed, dismissal will be a fair 
penalty.  The said approach is consistent with a progressive form of corrective 
discipline with a remedial purpose. 
 
3.2.3  ASSAULT 
 
Whether it is a minor assault or serious assault will be followed by a sanction of 
dismissal whether the employee is a first time offender or not, however, if the 
employee was provoked into committing the assault, the nature of such provocation 
and the workplace itself must be taken into consideration when imposing the 
sanction.  In general the assaults are viewed as behaviour which is unacceptable.  
The more serious the assault is, the greater the chances that dismissal will be 
appropriate action. 
 
3.2.4 CONFLICT OF INTEREST  
 
An employment contract is based on a mutual trust between the employer and the 
employee and any breach of such trust on the part of the employee will in serious 
cases  result into a dismissal  action.   If for  instance  the  employee  would  act  in  a 
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manner which is viewed as a direct competition with the business of his employer, or 
receives secret profits as a result of his employment status or his position, that will 
reflect dishonesty and a dismissal sanction could be imposed.  If the employee uses 
a property of his employer eg being a driver of a vehicle for his own personal gain 
neglecting his own duty (that of employer) a dismissal sanction could be imposed 
once the employer is prejudiced in any manner, but in the absence of dishonesty the 
employee would not normally be viewed as having a conflict of interest. 
 
In Premier Medical & Industrial v Wrinkler74 the court held that “there can be no doubt 
that during the currency of his contract of employment the servant owes a fiduciary 
duty to his master which involves an obligation not to work against his master’s 
interests. 
 
In SACTWU v R Stumpfe t/a De Lederhandler George75 where the court held that it 
was not unfair to dismiss, without a formal hearing, an employee who refused to stop 
making shoes in competition with the employer’s business. 
 
3.2.5 DAMAGE TO EMPLOYER’S PROPERTY 
 
If an employee wilfully damages any property of his employer a sanction of dismissal 
will be imposed.  In cases of negligently causing damage to such property the action 
may not be viewed as serious as when he wilfully and intentionally damages such 
property, a sanction of dismissal may not be imposed without warnings.  To promote 
the interests of the employer, the employee is under an obligation to safeguard the 
employer’s property. 
 
In NUMSA v Dunlop Flooring76 the Labour Appeal Court appears to have accepted 
that dismissal was justified in cases of malicious damage to property.  The appellant 
employee had been dismissed for malicious damage to company property, the 
Labour Appeal Court found that on the probabilities that the grounds for dismissal 
had been overwhelmingly established. 
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3.2.6 DISHONESTY 
 
It manifests itself in many ways, the non-disclosure of important information, 
supplying of false information, theft, fraud and pilfering.  In all the mentioned 
instances the conduct of the employee would be regarded as dishonest and would 
normally justify dismissal even summary dismissal.  The CCMA has a tendency of 
dealing with minor pilfering with leniency but the Labour Appeal Court has 
emphasised the importance of mutual trust and confidence in the employment 
relationship, it has even upheld dismissals as a result of dishonesty whether small 
amounts are involved.  Dishonesty could include cases of qualification 
misrepresentation. 
 
In Stroud v The Steel Engineering Co Ltd77 the Industrial Court upheld the dismissal 
of an employee, with twenty-seven years service in circumstances where the 
employee, while applying to join a benefit fund, intentionally concealed the fact that 
he was in receipt of benefits from other sources.  The court held that the failure to 
reply to a prominent and very important question was tantamount to a false answer 
and that dismissal was justified on the basis of the breach of trust between the 
employee and his employer.  Knowingly receiving wages that are not due has been 
held to be a fair reason for dismissal in ACTWUSA v JM Jacobson (Pty) Ltd.78 
 
3.2.7  GROSS DISHONESTY 
 
There is almost no difference between gross dishonesty and dishonesty, the 
principles are the same.  In cases of serious dishonesty (gross) where the employees 
enrich themselves unlawfully with the property of the employer, dismissal will be 
justified.  In the case of Hoch v Musteck Electronics (Pty) Ltd79 an employee 
submitted a false claim that she possessed formal qualifications was held to have 
irreparably destroyed the employment relationship.  In cases where a supervisor will 
close his eyes to theft by employees is as guilty as perpetrators.  In the case of CWIU 
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v Total SA (Pty) Ltd80 the driver of a petrol truck from which 4 000 liters of fuel had 
disappeared was held by the Court to have been fairly dismissed for the disciplinary 
offence of failure to care for company products even though theft or fraud on his part 
could not be proved. 
 
3.2.8 INSUBORDINATION 
 
Any employee who refuses to obey lawful and reasonable instruction by the 
employer will be charged for insubordination which is viewed as a serious conduct 
since the employment relationship is based on mutual respect and inherently of 
subordination.  Therefore the employer must be in a position of authority at all times 
without being undermined.  The act of insubordination could be “gross” and in such a 
case dismissal would be imposed.  It will be a case of gross insubordination if the 
conduct is deliberate, intentional and is sustained for a very long time, but it must be 
a reasonable instruction and must relate to work performance. 
 
Insurbordination incorporates an element of disobedience, or challenging the 
authority of the employer.  In CCAWUSA v Wooltru Ltd t/a Woolworths (Randburg)81 
the definition of insurbordination was defined as follows: 
 
 “When the employee refuses to obey a lawful and reasonable command or request 
and the refusal is wilful and serious (wilful disobedience), or when the employee’s 
conduct poses a deliberate (wilful) and serious challenge to the employer’s authority.” 
 
In Johannes v Polyoak Industries,82 the employee refused to complete certain quality 
checklists until the employer attended to her complaints.  She admitted that this 
amounted to an offence, but claimed that the employer had acted unfairly when it had 
dismissed her because she had merely asked for a small indulgence.  The court was 
unimpressed, saying that “it must have been clear to the employee that her lone 
crusade would end in disaster.  The employer could not reasonably be expected to  
endure such defiance”. 
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3.2.9 DESERTION 
 
The act of desertion is different from the act of absence from duty without leave.  The 
employee without any good reason would stay away from work with no intention of 
returning back to work and unless such an employee produces justified reasons for 
such desertion a sanction of dismissal would be imposed. 
 
3.2.10 INTIMIDATION 
 
Intimidation is a threatening conduct by an employee against anyone at work if such 
a threat will induce reasonable fear of being harmed in the person against whom 
such a threat is directed.  Such a conduct is viewed seriously even in cases of first 
time offence.  A sanction of dismissal would be imposed.  In Fulcrum Engineering v 
Chauke83 the Labour Appeal Court held that a trade union representative had been 
fairly dismissed for intimidating the workforce not to participate in a project initiated by 
the employer.  The court said about intimidation in the workplace: 
 
“This court will do the cause of worker advancement through collective action a 
disservice by flinching from accepting the real import of such evidence of workplace 
intimidation.  It is plain that in 1997, as in late 1994 when the events under discussion 
in the case occurred, we are a national which is increasingly bedeviled by coercive 
conduct.  Intimidation and coercion in the workplace stifle our national life in various 
ways.  First, intimidation casts a pall of fear and inhibition over the workplace, thereby 
damaging productivity essential to our nation’s wellbeing.  Secondly, it casts its sombre 
shadow beyond the workplace into the lives of the communities from which the 
workers come.  But thirdly, and from a union point of view perhaps most importantly, 
intimidation is destructive of unions themselves, whose leadership and social strength 
depend upon their moral authority.  Moral authority can derive only from consent.  It 
can never derive from intimidation.” 
 
3.2.11 NEGLIGENCE 
 
In this instance there is no deliberate intention to commit an offence by the employee 
and there is consistency in awards when considering the appropriateness of a 
sanction of dismissal.  The damage or loss incurred by the employer as a result of 
the employee’s conduct will not be a determining factor but in cases involving senior 
employees who bear a high level of trust and responsibility who negligently cause a 
                                                 
83  (1997) 18 ILJ 679 (LAC). 
  35 
serious damage or loss to the property of the employer, a sanction of dismissal can 
be imposed.  In some cases of this nature the CCMA has considered the 
contributor’s negligence of the employers when employees not suitable for a specific 
job are placed on such jobs without being assisted through training and guidance 
when determining the appropriateness of a dismissal sanction. 
 
3.2.12 SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
 
Sexual harassment constitutes a serious form of misconduct, usually at the 
workplace.  In most cases it is directed at the woman employee by an employer or a 
male employee, however, it is possible that the act could be between the members of 
the same sex. 
 
Conduct which can constitute sexual harassment can take the form of innuendo, 
suggestions, inappropriate gestures, fondling without consent of the woman’s body 
and even rape, the advances must be done against the will of the victim.  A single act 
can constitute the harassment but according to Grogan84 “a single assault will not 
necessarily amount to sexual harassment, even if it is sexually motivated”.  I find it 
very difficult to support the principle since the offence has been committed and 
sexual motivation has been proved to be present and the intention is clear.  The 
same author goes on to say: 
 
“However, this does not mean that such a conduct will be condoned, and still amounts 
to assault.” 
 
In J v M Ltd 85 the court held that, “it is in my opinion also not necessary that the 
conduct must be repeated.  A single act can constitute sexual harassment”. 
 
The sexual advances must be unwanted unsolicited and persistent.  In English law 
the sexual harassment is viewed very seriously and persistent and unwanted 
amorous advances by an employer to a woman employee has been held to 
constitute constructive dismissal.  This was a decision of the court in the case of 
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Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp.86  In America sexual harassment is viewed 
as a form of discrimination that should be prohibited by employers and that 
employers should adopt measures that would protect their employees from 
harassment by other employees and by customers. 
 
In the case of J v M87 the South African court took a similar view, and it upheld the 
dismissal of a senior executive for his amorous behaviour.  The court went on to 
state that depending on the form it took, such behaviour violates the victim’s right to 
integrity of the body and personality, and is aggravated in the employment context by 
the fact that the victims are sometimes afraid to complain because they fear this 
could lead to loss of employment opportunities or even to a dismissal. 
 
De Kock defined sexual harassment in the J v M 88 case as follows: 
 
 “In its narrowest form sexual harassment occurs when a woman (or man) is expected 
to engage in sexual activity in order to obtain or keep employment or obtain promotion 
or other favourable working conditions.  In its wider view it is however any unwanted 
sexual behaviour or comments, which has a negative effect on the recipient.  Conduct 
that can constitute sexual harassment ranges from innuendo, inappropriate gestures, 
suggestions or hints or fondling without consent or by force to its worse form, namely 
rape.  It is in my opinion also not necessary that the conduct must be repeated.” 
 
From the definition two approaches have been identified: 
 
· A narrow view which recognises sexual harassment as when someone is forced 
into sexual engagement in order to get a job or keep a job, be promoted and 
even enjoy favourable working conditions. 
 
· An unwanted sexual behaviour or even comment that negatively affects the 
recipient or the victim.  The elements of sexual harassment will entail the 
following: 
 
- The behaviour must be unwanted by the victim. 
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- It must be of a sexual nature. 
 
- The behaviour could be in any of the following forms: verbal, physical eg 
by touching certain body parts or non-verbal ways.  The unwanted 
behaviour must be distinguished from the behaviour that is accepted and 
welcome.  Physical contact will include rape or ordering the victim to strip 
in full view of other people who may be of the opposite sex. 
 
Verbal 
 
It includes innuendoes, comments with sexual overtones, inappropriate comments or 
enquiries about a person’s sex life, sex related jokes and comment about one’s body 
structure. 
 
Non-verbal 
 
It will include offensive and distasteful gestures such as eye-winking, indecent 
exposure and the display of sexual explicit pictures and objects. 
 
Quid pro quo 
 
The abuse of authority by an employer or his representative, including all members of 
the management who have the power to influence the powers of employment, 
dismissal, salary adjustments, benefits, promotions by the suggestion of sexual 
favours.  In Sookunan v SA Post Office,89 where the applicant, a supervisor and 
acting postmaster, the CCMA Commissioner made a distinction between quid pro 
quo harassment and hostile work environment harassment.  The quid pro quo form of 
harassment was viewed more seriously than the environment harassment, although 
both forms of harassment might justify dismissal.  “The evidence which included the 
pressure applied by the supervisor on the two complainants to drop the charges 
against him, smacked of the threats usually associated with quid pro quo harassment 
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concluded the inquiry.”  In considering the appropriate sanction the Commissioner 
considered the following to be aggravating factors: 
 
1. Although he claimed he did not see the relevant notices prohibiting sexual 
harassment at work, he knew and understood the subject of sexual 
harassment. 
 
2. He was effectively the complainant’s boss. 
 
3. He tried to use that position to discourage the first complainant from reporting 
the matter. 
 
4. His conduct was not isolated but directed to more than one female staff 
member and repetitive in both instances despite resistance. 
 
5. His actions included physical touching and groping. 
 
6. He interfered with the complainants after charges had been laid. 
 
On this basis the Commissioner found that the employee’s conduct had irretrievably 
damaged the employment relationship and that dismissal was the appropriate 
sanction.  The application was dismissed. 
 
Hostile environment 
 
In some workplaces the walls are pasted with posters or writings of sexual jokes and 
even abusive language, such an environment offends many people and the place is 
viewed very hostile. 
 
Sexual favouritism 
 
Where a person who is in a position of authority rewards only those people who 
respond to his sexual behaviour when deserving people who refuse his sexual 
advances are denied jobs, promotion, merit rating or salary increases. 
  39 
 
3.2.12.1 CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE ON THE HANDLING OF SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT CASES (THE CODE) 
 
The Code provides guidance to employers, employees and others in the workplace.  
It was developed by NEDLAC to deal with cases of sexual harassment issued in 
terms of section 203(1) of the Labour Relations Act.90 
 
3.2.12.2 THE COMPANY POLICY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
 
The employers must affirm everyone’s right to be treated with dignity at the 
workplace in a form of a written statement. 
 
- Sexual harassment must be prohibited in the workplace. 
 
- There must be a mechanism that are put in place to deal with such behaviour in 
the form of a grievance procedure and other reporting forms. 
 
- Such cases must be investigated without undue delay. 
 
A strong approach when dealing with the behaviour may help deter many 
people and that could lead to a harmonious working relationship at work.  
Nothing will create a sense of security and protection to the victims of this 
behaviour than to deal with or approach such cases very seriously, sensitively, 
confidentially and the assurance that they will be protected against 
victimisation, retaliation and false accusation.  It is very common today that 
people who are accused of sexual harassment they tend to retaliate by lodging 
similar grievance against their victims.  The complaints must be investigated 
thoroughly by people who understand the sexual harassment.  In some cases it 
transpires that the sexual harassment is a fabricated story if one feels that he or 
she has been overlooked for a specific task he or she wanted in the job 
situation.  It is best to inform all employees about the policy on sexual 
harassment at the workplace and the range of disciplinary sanctions that could 
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be imposed if found guilty.  The management should implement the policy and 
take disciplinary action against employees who do not comply with the policy.  
A policy on sexual harassment must explain the procedure which the victims 
must follow when reporting the grievance. 
 
- That sexual harassment in the workplace will not be permitted or condoned. 
 
- Persons who have been or are being subjected to sexual harassment in the 
workplace have the right to lodge a grievance about it and appropriate action 
will be taken by the employer. 
 
3.2.12.3 GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
 
· The employers must create and maintain a climate in which victims of sexual 
harassment will not feel that their grievances are ignored or trivialised or fear 
reprisals. 
 
· Employers, managers and employees must refrain from committing acts of 
sexual harassment. 
 
· They have a role in creating and maintaining a working environment in which 
sexual harassment is prohibited. 
 
· The employers must protect people who are doing business with the company 
such as customers, suppliers, job applicants and others from being subjected to 
sexual harassment by the employer or its employees. 
 
· Employers are required to take appropriate action when instances of sexual 
harassment are brought to their attention.  The Code recognises the importance 
of collective agreements regulating the handling of sexual harassment and is 
not intended to substitute of collective agreements or the outcome of joint 
decision-making by an employer and a workplace forum, but such collective 
agreements should be guided by the provisions of the Code. 
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3.2.12.4 PROCEDURES 
 
Employers must develop clear procedures to deal with sexual harassment which will 
ensure the resolutions of problems in a sensitive, efficient and effective way. 
 
3.2.12.5 ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE 
 
The victim may feel unable to face the perpetrator, lodge a formal grievance or turn 
to colleagues for support.  It would be good if employers should designate a person 
outside of line management whom victims may approach for confidential advice.  
Such a person could be a person employed to perform such a function or a trade 
union representative, or co-employee or an outside professional, with appropriate 
skills and experience. 
 
Could be required to have counseling and relevant labour relations skills and be able 
to provide support and advice on a confidential basis. 
 
3.2.12.6 OPTIONS IN RESOLVING A PROBLEM 
 
The employees should be advised that there are two options in resolving sexual 
harassment.  The problem could be resolved in a formal way or a formal procedure 
can be embarked upon.  It is important that the employee should not be forced to 
accept one or the other option. 
 
3.2.12.7 INFORMAL PROCEDURE 
 
The employee concerned may be happy to have an opportunity to explain to the 
person engaging in the unwanted conduct that the behaviour is not welcome, it 
offends her or makes her uncomfortable and that it interferes with his/her work.  If this 
approach does not help or stop the behaviour it may be more appropriate to embark 
upon a formal procedure. 
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3.2.12.8 FORMAL PROCEDURE 
 
If the formal procedure is chosen, it should be made available to the aggrieved party 
and should specify with whom the employee should make the grievance or 
complaint.  The matter should be dealt with immediately as to the time frames, 
provide that should the case not be resolved satisfactorily, the matter can be dealt 
with in terms of the dispute procedures. 
 
3.2.12.9 INVESTIGATION AND DISCIPLINARY ACTION 
 
The investigation of sexual harassment must not disadvantage the aggrieved party, 
and that the position of other parties is not prejudiced should the grievance be found 
to be groundless.  The Code of Good Practice regulating dismissal contained in 
Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act91 provides that an employee may be 
dismissed for serious misconduct, or repeated offences.  Serious incidents of sexual 
harassment or continued harassment after warnings are dismissible offences. 
 
The disciplinary sanctions to which employees will be liable should be clearly stated 
and that it will be a disciplinary offence to retaliate, victimise an employee who in 
good faith lodges a grievance of sexual harassment. 
 
3.2.12.10 CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CHARGES 
 
A sexual harassment victim has every right to press separate criminal and civil 
charges against an alleged perpetrator, and the legal rights of the victim are in no 
way limited by the Code. 
 
3.2.12.11 DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
If the victim of the alleged sexual harassment’s complaint is not satisfactorily 
resolved, either party may refer the matter to the CCMA within 30 days of the dispute 
having arisen for conciliation, and if the dispute is unresolved, any party may refer 
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the dispute to the Labour Court within 30 days after the receipt of the certificate 
issued by the commissioner to the fact that the matter is unresolved. 
 
3.2.12.12 CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
The investigation of grievances of sexual harassment must be handled in a manner 
that protects the identities of the people involved.  The parties concerned must 
endeavour to ensure confidentiality at the disciplinary inquiry.  The people who 
should be present at the enquiry are the members of the management who should be 
there, the aggrieved party or his representative, the perpetrator, witnesses and an 
interpreter, if required. 
 
3.2.12.13 ADDITIONAL SICK LEAVE 
 
When the complainant’s sick leave entitlement has been exhausted, the employer 
should consider granting additional sick leave in cases of serious sexual harassment 
where the complainant requires extensive medical care and trauma counseling. 
 
3.2.12.14 INFORMATION AND EDUCATION 
 
Since the sexual harassment is becoming a common problem in the workplace, it is 
necessary that the Department of Labour should distribute copies of the Code so that 
they are available at all workplaces. 
 
The information should be extended into orientation seminars, education and training 
programmes for all employees.  Organisations such as trade unions must cover 
sexual harassment in their education and training sessions for shop stewards and 
employees. 
 
It is therefore important and necessary that CCMA commissioners should receive 
specialised training in cases involving sexual harassment because of their sensitive 
nature. 
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3.2.12.15 PROVING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
 
Although there are quite many definitions of sexual harassment, the Code does not 
clearly defines what an employer must prove to secure a guilty verdict for the 
perpetrator of sexual harassment.  In Gerber v Algorax (Pty) Ltd 92 the arbitrator 
stated that: 
 
“I am of the view that the test to be applied to determine whether the conduct of the 
alleged perpetrator constitutes sexual harassment, should be an objective one.  
Campanella and Brassey in their article entitled ‘to refrain from embracing’ in 
Employment Law Vol 10 Part 4 suggested that the test is whether the advances were 
welcome or whether the accused reasonably believed them to be so.  So much was 
clear to the drafters of the Ontario Human Rights Code.  They defined harassment as 
engaging in a course of a vexatious comment or conduct that is known or ought 
reasonably known to be unwelcome.” 
 
Landman and Van Niekerk93 defines sexual harassment as follows: 
 
“Sexual harassment is unwanted conduct of a sexual nature.  The unwanted nature of 
sexual harassment distinguishes it from behaviour that is welcome and mutual.  Sexual 
attention becomes sexual harassment if 
 
(a) the behaviour is persisted in, although a single incident of harassment can 
constitute sexual harassment and/or 
 
(b) the recipient has made it clear that the behaviour is considered offensive; and/or 
 
(c) the perpetrator should have known that the behaviour is regarded as 
unacceptable.” 
 
The definition makes it clear that the perpetrator committed the act knowingly and 
with the intention, therefore negligence does not seem to constitute the offence.  To 
constitute the offence the act must be accompanied by intention to commit the 
offence.  The test is therefore twofold, that was the action of the perpetrator of such a 
nature that it can be classified under the definition of sexual harassment and whether 
the perpetrator knew or should reasonably have known that his actions or proposals 
would be unwelcome. 
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The employers and managers can no longer ignore or stand on the sideline with 
regards to the cases of sexual harassment, they must play a proactive role in its 
prevention.  The NEDLAC guidelines should be the basis of a substantive policy that 
needs to be adhered to and monitored strictly by employers if sexual harassment is 
to be overcome. 
 
In the case of Reddy v University of Natal94 Myburg stated that: “It would become 
paramount for an employer not merely to ignore the complaints with regard to sexual 
harassment”.  He went on to state that “in terms of the Constitution95 sexual 
harassment infringes the right to human dignity.  Everyone has inherent dignity and 
the right to have their dignity respected and protected and right to privacy enshrined 
in section 14”.  The failure by the employer to act or be proactive could have severe 
civil and criminal consequences, not only for the perpetrator but also for an employer. 
 
3.3 GROUP MISCONDUCT 
 
Sometimes it happens that an offence is committed at the workplace by unknown 
people making it difficult for the employer to point out the culprit because there is a 
group of employees employed who are working at the same place and the 
employees are not prepared to assist the employer by pointing out the culprit.  This is 
a difficult situation more so when a serious offence has been committed.  The 
employer may contemplate dismissing the whole group but there could be some 
problems in taking such a decision without first taking into account the possibility of 
intimidation to innocent workers who may lose their jobs for the sake of one or two 
culprits.  The employer must act tactfully when dealing with the situation, it would be 
better for him to approach the matter in a fair but serious manner.  In Chauke v Lee 
Service Centre CC t/a Leeson Motors,96 the employer had experienced a number of 
industrial sabotage in its paint shop, the culprits could not be traced, the employer 
issued an ultimatum that if any further damage was caused and the culprit was not 
identified, the entire paint shop and cleaning staff would be dismissed.  After another 
incident of sabotage the employer requested the workers to identify the culprit and 
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when they failed to do so all were dismissed.  The Industrial Court held that all were 
guilty of a systematic sabotage and dismissed their application for reinstatement.  On 
appeal, the Labour Appeal Court observed that the central question was whether the 
employer was entitled to dismiss a group of employees when a misconduct was 
committed by a member of the group who could not be identified.  They were all 
charged with a misconduct.  The justification of their dismissal were that they had all 
been obliged to assist in the identification of the culprit and that they shared a 
responsibility for the misconduct when they kept quiet.  The court noted that “where a 
worker has or might reasonably be supposed to have information concerning 
misconduct, failure to divulge it might amount to misconduct serious enough to 
undermine the relationship of trust with the employer, even if the employees were 
innocent of the initial misconduct.  However, in the present case it was unnecessary 
to decide whether the appellants had been guilty of ‘derivative misconduct’, as the 
respondent had dismissed them for their involvement in the primary misconduct”. 
 
There were two justifications for dismissing the workers.  Firstly, the failure to 
disclose the identity of the culprit in itself constitutes a dismissible offence and 
secondly, their silence in fact their refusal to disclose the culprit gives rise to the 
inference that they had made common cause with the actual culprit.  There are many 
ways of justifying action against an entire group where a misconduct has been 
committed by any of their group.  The doctrine of “common purpose” applied mostly 
in criminal law in which liability for an offence committed by an unknown person is 
attributed to those who assisted or made common purpose with the culprit.  In the 
case of SACCAWU v Cashbuild97 the entire staff of a branch of a company, from 
manageress down, was dismissed after it was discovered that its “shrinkage” level 
exceeded the maximum acceptable to management.  No individual could be 
identified or linked to the losses, the Industrial Court found that the company had 
acted fairly because it had clear rules regarding stock control, which had been 
negotiated with the workers.  The employees had been finally warned that further 
stock losses would result in their dismissals. 
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It was proper to dismiss the entire staff in such circumstances even though the notion 
of collective guilt was repugnant to our law.  In NSCAWU v Coin Security (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Coin Security98 the court emphasised that the doctrine of common purpose must not 
be confused with that of collective guilt, which rests on the supposition that an entire 
group can be punished simply because one of its members had committed a 
wrongful act, whereas the doctrine of common purpose can only be applied where it 
is proved on a balance of probabilities that the employees who did not actually 
perpetrate the act had common intention to bring about the unlawful result. 
 
The court agreed that while the workers were engaged in a collective action (strike) 
but there was nothing to show that any individual had been directly involved in any 
particular act of misconduct.  The employer was in fact relying, not on the doctrine of 
common purpose, but on the collective guilt, which, it said, was foreign to our legal 
system and repugnant to the principles of natural justice. 
 
3.4 WHOSE JUDGMENT: THE EMPLOYER’S OR THE PERPETRATOR’S? 
 
A value judgment in addition to findings of fact of law is very important when 
adjudicating the substantive fairness of a dismissal.  The reasonable employer’s test 
has been applied by our courts in so far as the first enquiry is concerned, but 
according to Le Roux and Van Niekerk99 the test has been rejected by our courts in 
so far as the first enquiry is concerned.  They argue that “by requiring the employer 
only to show that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the offence was 
committed rather than showing that, on the balance of probabilities, the offence was 
actually committed the court significantly lessened, the evidential burden placed on 
employers”. 
 
The application has been criticized and the courts have seemed to reject the 
approach and instead adopted the view that the balance of probabilities should be 
the standard to be applied.  The criticism of the reasonable employer test according 
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to Brassey et al100 to some extent overlooked the fact that, in English law, the 
concept of reasonableness is all pervasive. 
 
The reasonable employer test has been invoked by the South African Industrial Court 
on an ad hoc basis in three separate instances, eg  
 
(a) whether the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that the 
misconduct alleged was committed by the employee; 
 
(b) whether the procedure was reasonable in the circumstances; and 
 
(c) whether the penalty imposed by the employer was reasonable in the 
circumstances. 
 
The critics of the reasonable employer test have directed their critics at the 
requirement that the employer must have reasonable grounds for believing that the 
misconduct alleged was committed by the employee.  They argue that “a distinction 
should be drawn between reasonableness and fairness since what is fair is 
reasonable but what is reasonable is not necessarily fair, and secondly, that the 
purpose of the Labour Relations Act is defeated where there is no proper arbitrary 
into the facts.  The fairness of a dismissal is determined ultimately by consideration of 
injustice in the workplace.  The reasonable employer test compels a tribunal to focus 
its attention on the employer and not on any injustice the employee may suffer”.  In 
Ferodo Ltd v Barnes101 the English Employment Appeal Tribunal expressed the 
following view: 
 
“It seems to this Tribunal, therefore, that the law is quiet plain and that what the 
Industrial Tribunal ought to do is, not to ask the question which this Tribunal did.  Are 
we satisfied that the employers had, at the time of the dismissal, reasonable grounds 
for believing that the offence put against the applicant was in fact committed.” 
 
It is clear that in the employment context there is a valid distinction between fairness 
and reasonableness.  A determination of reasonableness requires a tribunal to 
                                                 
100  Brassey, Cameron, Cheadle and Olivier The New Labour Law (1987) at 72. 
101  Supra. 
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evaluate the actions of the employer not in terms of whether the tribunal thinks it was 
reasonable but in terms of whether an employer would think it was.  In a situation like 
this one has to ask a simple question whether the distinction between 
reasonableness and fairness necessary preclude any consideration of the 
reasonableness of the employer’s conduct in a determination of fairness.  Obviously 
not, provided that the concept of reasonableness employed is that of objective 
reasonableness.  The consideration of the employer test has given rise to the 
question of whether the court in determining the fairness of a dismissal will only look 
at the facts available to the employer when the employee is dismissed or whether 
any new evidence may be adduced during the proceedings.  In South Africa 
reasonableness is an objective concept just like in the English law.  Where 
wrongfulness is in issue, the question is whether it was objectively unreasonable for 
the employee to bring about the consequences he did when considered in the light of 
all factors and those not were foreseen by him and out of his control.  The main focus 
being on the effect of the conduct, wrongfulness expresses disapproval of the result 
of the employee’s conduct.  Reasonableness will always be viewed as a sense of 
objective reasonableness which inherently incorporates an effective approach to 
fairness.  The court is obliged to consider whether it was objectively reasonable for 
the employer to bring about the consequence he did.  In NUM v Vaal Reefs 
Exploration & Mining Co Ltd,102 the test for reasonableness was formulated as a test 
of “prevailing circumstances and social conditions plus the good judgment of the 
market place (boni mores)”.  Translated into as nothing more than the test for 
fairness, means of balancing competing rights and accommodating the vagaries of 
the workplace within a plurarist system.  The Labour Court has recognised the range 
of possible circumstances where a person may differ with another person without any 
of them being unreasonable.  In the case of Nampak Corrugated Wadeville v 
Khoza,103 the Labour Appeal Court applied the “reasonable” employer test of English 
law where the test is not whether the court or arbitrator would have imposed the 
same sanction imposed by the employer, but whether in the circumstances of the 
case the sanction was reasonable.  Later on the decision of the Nampak case was 
viewed by the court in the case of Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe104 
                                                 
102  (1987) 8 ILJ 776 (IC). 
103  Supra. 
104  D/A 2/99 unreported Labour Appeal Court 3 December 1999. 
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as wrongly decided, and that the proper approach was whether on the evidence 
before the arbitrator, the sanction imposed by the employer was fair.  It is clear 
therefore that the concept of fairness in dismissal cases on the part of the employer 
remains a dominant feature. 
 
The task faced by the chairperson of a disciplinary inquiry is quite difficult when he 
considers a suitable disciplinary sanction; he has to take into consideration a wide 
range of often conflicting issues, the fact that consistency has to be maintained and 
the fact that personal circumstances of an employee have to be taken note of are 
very important.  It is the reason you find that the decisions of the inquiry chairperson, 
the person hearing the appeal, the arbitrator often differ.  The question of the 
approach that must be applied by the courts and arbitrators should involve a 
measure of discretion and to some extent defer to the views of the manager making 
the decision but a caution must be exercised because if the courts and the arbitrators 
defer easily to the opinion of the manager there will always be a danger that 
protection against unfair dismissal will be weakened and that managerial disciplinary 
decisions will not be subject to sufficient control.  The approach is similar to the  
English industrial tribunals, their views as to the reasonableness of a sanction may 
differ and will not intervene if they are of the opinion that the sanction imposed by the 
employer is reasonable.  According to Le Roux105 the criticism of the application of 
the reasonable employer test in this context is that it requires no more than the 
lowest acceptable standard of reasonable managerial practice to be the norm.  In the 
English approach as was illustrated in the British Leyland (UK) Ltd v Swift106 as 
follows: 
 
 “The correct test is this: 
 
 Was it reasonable for the employer to dismiss him?  If no reasonable employer would 
have dismissed him, then the dismissal was unfair.  But if a reasonable employer might 
reasonably have dismissed him, then the dismissal was fair.  It must be remembered in 
all these cases there is a band of reasonableness, within which one employer might 
reasonably take one view; another (may) quite reasonably take a different view.” 
 
                                                 
105  The reasonable employer test in The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) at 106. 
106  (1981) IRLR 91. 
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According to Le Roux107 the acceptance of the manager’s margin by arbitrators when 
assessing the appropriateness of the sanction imposed by management is also not 
unknown in the United States of America and Canada.  The balancing of the interests 
involved is illustrated by the following excerpt: 
 
 “When confronted with a union grievance that challenges a decision by management, 
arbitrators will generally uphold management’s determination unless the union can 
show that the determination was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or contrary to 
the provisions of the labor contract.  Most arbitrators respect the results of collective 
bargaining as well as the managerial process and do not want to become ‘super-
managers’.  Yet they also believe they can properly protect the interests of the 
individual employee against decisions that go beyond the bounds of reasonable 
managerial discretion necessary to operate the enterprise.” 
 
The motivation for this view is expressed as follows: 
 
“In short, the awards reflect the general recognition by arbitrators that an arbitrator, as 
a third party, is generally incapable of being as sensitive to legitimate managerial 
needs as is management itself.  By utilising an appellate-type standard of review under 
which management decisions in this area are sustained so long as they are free from 
invidious motivations and are based upon the exercise of reason, judgment, and 
discretion, arbitrators give play to what was described above as the manager’s 
margin.”108 
 
Le Roux109 agrees that there will be a minority of cases where, in all honesty, they 
will realise that the matter is not that clear cut and that the manager’s decision may 
be justified even though the arbitrator or member does not necessary agree with it, 
he goes on to say that in such circumstances they should not intervene, provided that 
the manager’s decision is well reasoned and not the result of improper motivation. 
 
In the case of Bhengu v Union Co-operative Ltd110 the court stated that the employer 
has to establish whether he applied the “reasonable employer test” when he decided 
to dismiss the employee.  Where employees had deliberately falsified worksheets, 
unnecessary expense caused to the employer which resulted in the loss of 
confidence and dependability.  Dismissal was not unfair in such a situation. 
 
                                                 
107  Supra at 119. 
108  See Schoonhoven Fairweather’s Practice and Procedure in Labour Arbitration (BNA 1991) at 
205 and Brown and Beatty (note 3) 361. 
109  Supra at 118. 
110  (1990) 11 ILJ 117 (IC). 
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3.5 NON-WORK RELATED CONDUCT 
 
The employer may not take any disciplinary proceedings against an employee unless 
it can be shown that the act has some interest in the conduct of the employee, such 
as when there is some connection between the employee’s conduct and the 
employer’s business good name and reputation.  If the connection cannot be proved 
there can be no connection between the act and the workplace, more so if the 
conduct is committed outside the normal working hours.  The employer will have to 
prove that it has a legitimate interest in the matter.  In NUM v East Rand Gold & 
Uranium Co Ltd111 the employee was dismissed for assaulting a fellow employee on 
a company bus transporting employees to a local township after a shift work.  The 
employee applied for reinstatement to the Industrial Court.  It was argued on his 
behalf that the offence was non-work related and that the company consequently had 
no right to exercise any form of discipline against him.  The court held that the 
dismissal was competent notwithstanding the fact that the assault occurred after 
hours, away form the workplace, and in circumstances in which the employee who 
perpetrated the assault was not acting within the course and scope of his duties as 
an employee.  It was held that the employees in the bus were within the scope of 
their employment while in transit and therefore the company’s disciplinary arm was 
long enough to reach into the bus.  The court put an emphasis on the fact that the 
company owed a duty to ensure that its employees were transported safely and 
without interference.  In the case the act of the employee affected a legitimate 
interest since there was a connection between the employee’s conduct and the 
business of the employer. 
 
The company bus could have been labeled unsafe and a dangerous place to be, this 
could have had a detrimental effect on the good name of the company.  In Van Zyl v 
Duvha Opencast Services (Edms) Bpk112 the court refused to reinstate an employee 
who had been dismissed for assaulting his foreman after hours in the mine village.  
Argument by the union that the company had no right to take disciplinary action since 
the  offence was  not  work  related.   The court  held  that the  test  to be applied was 
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whether the offence was work related in the sense that it had an effect in the work 
situation.  The effect of the assault on the employment relationship was such that the 
company was entitled to take action. 
 
(a) The assault was perpetrated on the immediate supervisor. 
 
(b) The assault took place in the view of colleagues. 
 
(c) The harmonious relationship between the employees concerned and the 
residents of the mining was adversely affected. 
 
The decision of the court demonstrated the employer’s duty to create the safe and 
peaceful conditions of the employees.  In Mavumengwana v Samancor Ltd,113 the 
case concerned an assault on an immediate superior in an area of the company’s 
premises that was accessible to the public.  The court held that the incident was work 
related.   
 
It must be noted that in Hoechst (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 114 the Labour Appeal Court held 
that it was not competent for an employer to discipline an employee in circumstances 
where the alleged misconduct was perpetrated against a co-employee and was not 
covered by the disciplinary code.  The court formulated the test as follows: 
 
“In our view the competence of an employer to discipline an employee for misconduct 
not covered in a disciplinary code depends on a multi faceted factual enquiry.  This 
enquiry would include, but would not be limited to the nature of the misconduct, the 
nature of the work performed by the employee, the employer’s size, the nature and 
size of the employer’s workforce, the position which the employer occupies in the 
marketplace and its profile therein, the nature of the work or services performed by the 
employer, the relationship between the employee and the victim, the impact of the 
misconduct on the workforce as a whole, as well as on the relationship between 
employer and employee and the capacity of the employee to perform his job.  At the 
end of the enquiry what would have to be determined is if the employee’s misconduct 
‘had the effect of destroying, or of seriously damaging the relationship of employer and 
employee between the parties.  Employees holding the position of trust eg where an 
employee has a position of special trust, and the conviction violates that trust, 
dismissal would normally be justified.” 
 
                                                 
113  (1992) 1 LCD 200 (IC). 
114  (1993) 14 ILJ 1449 (LAC). 
  54 
The employer if he is of the view that a criminal conviction for non-related work 
conduct is serious enough, it is suggested that an enquiry must be held, the enquiry 
is not to establish the facts which gave rise to the conviction but rather to establish 
the extent to which it impinges on the employment relationship. 
 
In the NUM case115 the court quoted Anderman:116 
 
 “Where the act of misconduct by the employee consists of a criminal act committed out 
the scope of employment, however, this may also be a sufficient ground to warrant 
dismissal as long as the act has been shown to affect the business in some way.  Thus 
where the criminal act impinges in some way on the employment either by affecting the 
reputation of the business, or the employee during the course of his work, or where the 
employee has a position of special trust, criminal acts committed outside the scope of 
employment may be sufficient grounds to justify dismissal.” 
 
The English Code of Practice on Disciplinary Practice and Procedures117 provides as 
follows: 
 
 “These should not be treated as automatic reasons for dismissal regardless of whether 
the offence has any relevance to the duties of the individual as an employee.  The 
main consideration should be whether the offence is one that makes the individual 
unsuitable for his or her type of work or unacceptable to other employees.  Employees 
should not be dismissed solely because a charge against them is pending or because 
they are absent through having been remanded in custody.” 
 
There is not much difference between the two approaches.  What is clear is the fact 
that dismissal is possible for offences committed outside the scope of duty if such act 
is likely to taint the good name of the company. 
 
3.6 THEFT/UNAUTHORISED POSSESSION OF COMPANY GOODS118 
 
The unauthorised possession of goods belonging to the company by employees is 
very common in many companies, the actual intention in most cases is theft of such 
a property.  The common law views “theft” very seriously, it is a form of breach of the 
employment  contract  and  the  perpetrator loses all claim to further employment.  He 
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can be charged in a criminal court and be punished and still be dismissed from work.  
The Labour Appeal Court in Anglo American Farms t/a Boschendal Restaurant v 
Komjwayo119 held that the dismissal cannot constitute an unfair dismissal, but the 
Industrial Court made it clear in Nkomo v Pick ’n Pay Retailers120 that “petty pilfering” 
which did not manifest a degree of dishonest intent, did not justify dismissal.  The 
approach taken by the court is difficult to explain if one views that theft will always 
remain theft no matter how small or big the stolen item might be, if the intention to 
steal is proved then it is theft, however, recently the Labour Appeal Court has given 
some light in cases involving theft.  In the Anglo American Farms case121 the court 
regarded the value of the stolen item as relatively unimportant and considered 
instead the effect of the employee’s conduct on the employment relationship and, 
particularly, whether the continuation of the relationship could be regarded as 
intolerable. 
 
In Central News Agency (Pty) Ltd v CCAWUSA122 the Labour Appeal Court noted as 
follows: 
 
“In my view it is axiomatic to the relationship between the employer and employee that 
the employer should be able to rely upon the employee not to steal from the employer.  
This trust which the employer places in the employee is basic to and forms the 
substratum of the relationship between them.  A breach of this duty goes to the root of 
the contract of employment and of the relationship between employer and employee.  
An employer unquestionably is entitled to expect from his employees that they would 
not steal from him and if an employee does steal from the employer that is such a 
breach of the relationship and of the contract between them and such a gross and 
criminal dereliction of duty that dismissal undoubtedly would be justified and fair.” 
 
The appropriation of the employer’s goods with intention to permanently deprive him 
through stealing is viewed very serious and correctly so.  The stealing in the 
company by the employees can stagnate the production causing hardships to other 
employees who could be put on retrenchment, even early pension and short time as 
a result of such thefts.   In Williams v Gilbeys Distillers & Vinters (Pty) Ltd 123 the court 
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stated that: 
 
 “If an employer for instance mistrusts an employee for reasons he must obviously 
justify and he can show that such mistrust, as a result of certain misconduct of the 
employee is counterproductive to his commercial activities or to the public interest 
(where appropriate) he would be entitled to terminate the relationship.” 
 
This is very fair because where there is a lack of trust, relationship is not strong and 
there can be no fruitful results that could flow from such a situation. 
 
3.7 UNAUTHORISED USE OF COMPANY VEHICLES 
 
The company’s vehicles sometimes are used by the drivers of the company without 
authority, the vehicles are used in most cases for private business.  The conduct has 
been viewed very serious and a dismissal is always imposed, particularly where there 
is an order prohibiting such unauthorised use.  In Tool Wholesale (Pty) Ltd and 
CCAWUSA124 the arbitrator refused to uphold a dismissal for unauthorised use of a 
company vehicle where it was not clear that a previoius warning had been conveyed 
to the employee that a repetition of the offence would lead to dismissal as opposed to 
some lesser form of discipline. 
 
To be effective, there must be an order written or verbal to the effect that 
unauthorised use of the company’s vehicles is prohibited and an employee would be 
dismissed if found guilty by the enquiry.  The employer could also open a criminal 
case against the employee. 
 
In Interstate Matsebulas Bus Service and TGWU125 the arbitrator found that a 
dismissal for the use of a company vehicle for a purpose other than that for which it 
was given was not unfair in circumstances where the employee was involved in an 
accident during a period of unauthorised use. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Substantive fairness requires a valid and fair reason for dismissal on the grounds of 
misconduct.  The old style of discipline under the common law was authoritarian and 
paternalistic, it afforded the employer wide powers of dismissal with little, in fact very 
insignificant security of employment for the employee, this was the result of the 
economic and social ordering which existed at the time, also the employer’s 
ownership of and control of the company.  According to Brassey: 126 
 
 “The common law offers little protection against arbitrariness.  It allows the party with 
the greater bargaining power to extract any bargain he wants, however oppressive, 
perverse or absurd it may be, provided that it is not illegal or immoral.  It allows him to 
change it when it no longer suits him, by threatening to terminate the relationship 
unless the other party submits to the change.  It allows him to flout the bargain 
whenever he likes, provided that he does not mind paying a paltry sum, which is 
invariably all the damages amount to.  And all this he is allowed to do without 
consulting the other party first, or paying the slightest heed.” 
 
Legislation intervention helped by improving the position of the employee more 
especially the present LRA.  In the area of dismissals there has been a significant 
departure from the common law approach.  The new approach under the LRA puts it 
in no uncertain terms that it is not sufficient for the employer to act lawfully when he 
dismisses an employee, he must also act fairly, meaning that sufficient reasons must 
be proved before the employee can be dismissed from work followed of course by a 
fair procedure before dismissal is pronounced. 
 
The substantive validity of the dismissal requires that a valid reason should have 
existed when the employee is dismissed.  The reason must be evident and the onus 
lies with the employer to prove reasonable grounds for his decision that the 
employee concerned has committed the alleged misconduct and apart from the 
requirement that a valid reason in fact exists, it is furthermore required that the 
reason must have been serious enough to warrant dismissal.  The provisions of the 
ILO Recommendations have also been regarded as decisive guidelines in regard to 
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the conduct of an employer in which matters surrounding dismissals are measured.  
The courts always refer to the ILO Recommendation 119 of 1963 on the termination 
of employment concerning a valid reason for dismissal.  Section 188 of the LRA 
provides that 
 
 “if a dismissal is not automatically unfair, it is unfair if the employer fails to prove that 
the dismissal is for a fair reason related to the employee’s conduct, and that the 
dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure.” 
 
The International Labour Organisation Convention 158 has a similar classification.  
Article 4 of the Convention provides that “the employment of a worker shall not be 
terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination connected with the 
capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the 
undertaking, establishment or service”. 
 
The Convention also requires a fair procedure that will enable the worker an 
opportunity to defend himself against the allegations put against him before the 
dismissal. 
 
In the employment relationship of today it is not a matter of contract alone as was the 
case under the era of common law.  Under the common law period it is noticed that 
the authority received statutory endorsement from the state in the form of master and 
servant legislation in which criminal sanction was invoked to enforce discipline at 
work.  In cases of the employee’s dismissal there is a clear shift from the common 
law position which offered little protection against unfair dismissal.  The belief that 
only management could make disciplinary decisions and that there could be no 
question or challenge by employees was drastically changed by the legislation 
intervention which curbed the arbitrary exercise of the employer’s disciplinary rules 
which were sometimes administered in a harsh and inconsistent manner. 
 
The modern employment relationship emphasises a more enlightened and 
acceptable approach when dealing with disciplinary matters in the workplace.  The 
LRA recognises that dismissal from work is a serious issue that should be reserved 
for serious cases of indiscipline, the employer must try and find a mechanism of 
corrective discipline.  He must give guidance of what is expected from the employee 
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and that unacceptable conduct will not be tolerated.  In essence the reason for 
dismissal will be regarded as fair if the employee’s misconduct is regarded as serious 
under the circumstances and if the facts show that the employee knew that he could  
be dismissed for such a misconduct. 
 
Substantive fairness of dismissal for misconduct implies that an honest endeavour to 
fairly justify the dismissal was undertaken by the employer.  Substantive fairness of a 
dismissal also involves the question whether the sanction of a dismissal was suitable 
in the circumstances as the Labour Court requires the employers to consider 
sanctions short of dismissal, such as suspension, demotion, final warnings and 
mitigating factors before terminating the contract of employment for disciplinary 
misconduct, something not known during the common law era.  Although the factors 
are not definitive the employer must nevertheless be shown to have considered them 
at the time of dismissal. 
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